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Introduction
In 2007 the Cuban government began the implementa-
tion of agricultural reforms to increase production, improve 
efficiency, and reduce the country’s dependency on imported 
food and agricultural products. The most significant meas-
ures included: (a) increases in the prices paid by the state 
for certain agricultural products, (b) the reorganisation of 
the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) and the Ministry of 
the Sugar Industry (MINAZ), (c) a new agricultural tax 
regime, (d) direct sales and decentralisation of selected 
agricultural products, (e) micro-credits by state banks to 
non-state agricultural producers, and (f) the expansion of 
usufruct farming, which constitutes the most profound and 
far-reaching structural reform in the recent history of Cuban 
agriculture. 
This paper discusses the agricultural reforms imple-
mented in Cuba since 2007, as part of its efforts to “update” 
its socialist economic model, and evaluates the impact of 
these reforms on two important indicators: (1) land distri-
bution and (2) non-sugar agricultural production. The paper 
is organized as follows. Section one describes the agricul-
tural reforms implemented in Cuba since 2007. Section two 
analyses the impact of these reforms on land distribution 
and non-sugar agricultural production during the 2007-
2017 period. Section three presents the conclusions of the 
paper.
Cuba’s Agricultural Reforms: 2007- Present 
Prices increases for selected agricultural products
Beginning in 2007, Cuba’s state-run agricultural procure-
ment and distribution agency, Acopio, raised the prices it paid 
to agricultural producers for a selected group of products, 
including beef, milk, potatoes, and rice (Nova González and 
González-Corzo, 2015).1 To incentivise non-sugar agricul-
tural production, between 2007 and 2013, Acopio increased 
the price it paid rice producers by 226.5%; similarly, the 
price paid for potatoes was raised by 20%; the price paid to 
milk producers increased by 479.8%, and the price paid to 
beef producers rose by 263.3% (Spadoni, 2014).
The approval of Resolutions 238 and 239 in 2015 
increased the prices paid by Acopio for beef, milk, potatoes, 
and tomatoes. The price of beef was raised from 6.50 Cuban 
pesos (CUP) per kilogram (kg) to 12 CUP / kg; milk prices 
were increased from 2.50 CUP per litre (L) to 4.50 CUP/L; 
the price of potatoes was raised from 45 CUP per quintal 
(qq) to 65 CUP/qq; and the price of tomatoes was increased 
from 100 CUP/qq to 110 CUP/qq (Cubadebate, 2015; Gaceta 
Oficial de Cuba 18, 2015). 
Restructuring of the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) 
and the Ministry of the Sugar Industry (MINAZ)
The approval of Decree-Law 287 in 2011 restructured 
the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) and the Ministry of 
the Sugar Industry (MINAZ) in order to improve efficiency. 
The MINAG was placed in charge of managing the areas 
dedicated to sugar cane cultivation, which were previously 
administered by the Ministry of the Sugar Industry (MINAZ) 
(Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 37, 2011). The MINAG also became 
responsible for overseeing all aspects of non-sugar agricul-
tural production, as well as the functions related to sugar 
1 Acopio, which is officially known as the Unión Nacional de Acopio (UNA), cur-
rently operates under the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) and consists of 12 en-
terprises (empresas nacionales) and 15 basic enterprise units (Unidades Empresariales 
de Base – UEBs) that operate nationwide, except in the provinces of Artemisa, Maya-
beque, and Havana, and in the Isle of Youth, where the direct commercialization of 
selected agricultural products is permitted (Martín González, 2018). Acopio supplies 
an estimated 400 state-run agricultural markets (Mercados Agropecuarios Estatales – 
MAEs) and some 1,200 agricultural sales outlets (puntos de venta) on daily basis with 
domestic agricultural products, which are collected from state farmers, agricultural 
cooperatives, and private producers (e.g., independent farmers and usufructuraries) 
(Martín González, 2018).
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production previously assigned to the MINAZ under Law 95 
– also known as the “Law of Agricultural Production Coop-
eratives and Credit and Services Cooperatives” approved in 
2002 (Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 37, 2011).
Decree-Law 294 replaced the Ministry of the Sugar 
Industry (MINAZ) with a State-owned holding company 
known as Grupo Azucarero, S.A. (AZCUBA) in 2011 (Gac-
eta Oficial de Cuba 37, 2011). AZCUBA reports directly to 
the Council of Ministers, and is responsible for implement-
ing policies and strategies related to the production of sugar 
and its derivatives (Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 37, 2011). 
The replacement of the MINAZ with AZCUBA in 2011 
was part of the continuation of the restructuring process initi-
ated in 2002, which consisted of four (4) key elements: (1) 
closing 71 of the country’s 156 sugar mills, (2) repurposing 
14 mills to specialise in the production of sugar and molas-
ses for animal feed, (3) reallocating land from sugar to non-
sugar crop production, and (4) reassigning some 100,000 
sugar industry workers to other sectors of the economy, 
particularly tourism (Álvarez and Pérez-López, 2005; Pérez-
López, 2016; Pollit, 2010).
Since 2002, there has been a notable reduction in the area 
dedicated to sugarcane cultivation, particularly in the state 
sector (Pérez-López, 2016). This trend has continued after 
the replacement of the MINAZ with AZCUBA in 2011. Dur-
ing the 2001/2002 harvest (or zafra), the last year before the 
2002 restructuring, a total of 1,041,200 hectares (ha) were 
dedicated to sugar cane (ONEI, 2017). A year later, during 
the 2002/2003 harvest, the area dedicated to sugar cane 
fell by 38.2% to 643,800 ha (ONEI, 2017). During the first 
harvest under AZCUBA in 2011/2012, the area dedicated 
to sugar reached a historical low of 361,300 ha, which was 
65.2% below the area dedicated to sugar cane during the 
2001/2002 harvest (ONEI, 2017).
The reduction in the area dedicated to sugar cane pro-
duction, along with the massive reduction in the number of 
operating sugar mills, and the marked decline of the sugar 
agro-industrial complex since 2002 have adversely impacted 
Cuba’s sugar production and exports (Pollit, 2010; Pérez-
López, 2016). Between 2011 and 2016, Cuba’s sugar pro-
duction reached an annual average of 1.5 million metric tons 
(mt), which is quite low by historical standards; and in recent 
years, Cuba has been forced to import sugar from Brazil, 
Colombia, and (more recently) France, to meet its interna-
tional obligations and satisfy domestic demand (Hernández, 
2018). Sugar output for the 2018/2019 harvest is expected to 
fall well below the 1.6 million mt forecasted by AZCUBA at 
the beginning of the year, signalling the continuation of the 
ongoing decline of this vital sector of the Cuban economy 
(Hernández, 2018)
A New Agricultural Tax System
Law 113 introduced a new agricultural tax system in 
Cuba in 2012. Under Law 113 (2012), natural and legal per-
sons that possess agricultural land, including forested areas 
and idle land, regardless of the type of tenure or ownership, 
are required to pay taxes in Cuban pesos (CUP) for the pos-
session and utilization of such land based on its classifica-
tion (Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 53, 2012). Law 113 (2012) also 
introduced income (or sales) taxes for individual agricultural 
producers, agricultural cooperatives, and state-owned agri-
cultural enterprises. Initially, agricultural producers were 
given a two-year grace period, during which they were 
exempted from the land and sales taxes established by Law 
113 (2012). This grace period was extended several times 
until the approval of Decree-Laws 350 and 358 in August 
2018, which stipulated that agricultural producers must 
pay land and income (sales) taxes as stipulated in Law 113 
(2012) (Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 39, 2018).2
Agricultural land, including forested areas and idle land, 
classified as Level I (or top-quality agricultural land) is sub-
ject to a land tax of 180 CUP per hectare (ha) (Gaceta Oficial 
de Cuba 53, 2012). Holders of agricultural land classified as 
Level II are required to pay a land tax of 90 CUP/ha; those 
who possess Level III land are required to pay a land tax of 
90 CUP/ha; and holders of Level IV land (i.e., land consid-
ered to be of the worst quality – often covered by marabú3) 
are required to pay a land tax of 45 CUP/ha. (Gaceta Oficial 
de Cuba 53, 2012). According to official estimates, only 20% 
of Cuba’s agricultural surface is considered as Level I land 
(Castro Morales, 2018).4
According to Law 113 (2012), individual agricultural 
producers are required to pay a minimum income (sales) 
tax of 5%. They are also required to pay additional taxes 
on personal income based on the following scale: 10% on 
annual income up to 12,000 CUP, 15% on annual income 
between 12,001 CUP and 24,000 CUP, 20% on annual 
income between 24,001 CUP and 48,000 CUP, 30% on 
annual income between 48,001 CUP and 72,000 CUP, 35% 
on annual income between 72,001 CUP and 100,000 CUP, 
40% on annual income between 100,001 CUP and 150,000 
CUP, and 45% on annual income of 150,001 CUP or higher 
(Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 53, 2012).5
Law 113 (2012) establishes a minimum income (sales) 
tax of 5% for agricultural cooperatives and state-run agri-
cultural enterprises. Agricultural Production Cooperatives 
(Cooperativas de Producción Agropecuaria – CPA) and 
2 According to Cuban authorities, the tax on idle land (which became effective after 
August 2018) aims to incentivize holders to “put their idle land to productive use” 
(i.e. to plant it with suitable crops) (Castro Morales, 2018). While the land tax on idle 
land is not intended as a source of tax revenue for the state, according to Law 125 of 
the State Budget for 2018, the revenues collected will be used to support the country’s 
agricultural programs and policies (Castro Morales, 2018). Unlike other agricultural 
taxes, land tax payments cannot be deducted (Castro Morales, 2018).
3 Marabú (Dichrostachys cinerea) grows in large, open spaces (e.g. unattended pas-
tures or grazing areas, abandoned or idle agricultural land, etc.) and thrives under vari-
ous climatic conditions (e.g., intense heat, arid terrain, etc.). It is hard to cut down, 
often requiring mechanised cutting and elimination by chemical treatment. In the case 
of Cuba, marabú occupies a significant portion of Cuba’s idle agricultural land and 
underutilised pastures.
4 For tax purposes, Level I land is defined as high quality land suitable for diverse 
types of crops, with the potential of reaching 70% or more of its minimum potential 
yield (as defined by the MINAG) (Castro Morales, 2018). Level II land consists of 
good quality land, which requires some minimal conservation or soil improvement 
measures, and can potentially achieve between 50% and 70% of its estimated (agricul-
tural) yield (Castro Morales, 2018). Level III land includes medium quality land, with 
medium or low fertility levels, which require significant conservation or soil improve-
ment measures, and can achieve agricultural yields ranging from 30% to 50% of their 
estimated potential (Castro Morales, 2018). Finally, Level IV land consists of poor 
quality land, with relatively low fertility rates, often covered in marabú, requiring very 
large conservation or soil improvement measures, and normally dedicated to reforesta-
tion or similar purposes (Castro Morales, 2018).
5 The first 10,500 CUP of income are exempted from the income (sales) tax; indi-
vidual agricultural producers can deduct up to 70% of the expenses incurred during the 
regular course of business, and are only required to provide supporting documentation 
for half of the deducted expenses (Castro Morales, 2018; Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 53, 
2012).
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Basic Units of Cooperative Production (Unidades Básicas de 
Producción Cooperativa – UBPC) are required to pay addi-
tional income taxes on their per capita income (i.e. income 
per associate or member) based on the following scale 
(Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 53, 2012): 5% on annual per capita 
income up to 10,500 CUP, 10% on annual per capita income 
between 10,501 CUP and 23,500 CUP, 12% on annual per 
capital income between 23,501 CUP and 46,500 CUP, and 
17.5% on annual per capita income of 46,501 or higher.6
Decentralized Commercialization of Selected Agricul-
tural Products
The approval of Agreement 6853 and Resolution 206 
in 2010 authorised the direct sale of agricultural products 
at roadside kiosks operated by agricultural cooperatives, 
self-employed workers and state enterprises (González-
Corzo, 2013). Producers or their representatives operating 
in roadside kiosks are allowed to sell their excess produc-
tion after meeting their contractual obligations with Acopio 
(González-Corzo, 2013).7 
Resolutions 90, 121, 122, and 369 (2011) regulate direct 
sales of selected agricultural products to tourism enterprises 
(Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 38, 2011). Resolution 90 (2011) cre-
ated a new entity, Fintour, S.A., to provide credit financing, 
factoring services, and consultancy to tourism enterprises, 
including those that buy directly from authorised agricultural 
producers (Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 38, 2011).8 Prices can be 
determined without state intervention; payments can only 
be made in Cuban pesos (CUP), unless otherwise stated; 
however, in the case of transactions approved in convertible 
pesos (CUC), Fintour, S.A. is authorized to act as a transfer 
payments agent, and converts CUC to CUP at a predeter-
mined exchange rate (Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 38, 2011).9
The approval of Resolutions 37, 58, and 352 in 2013 
authorised direct sales of selected agricultural products in 
Cuban pesos (CUP) to tourism enterprises by all types of 
agricultural producers, without state intermediation, includ-
ing individual (private) farmers and usufructuaries. The list 
of authorized products was expanded to include fresh cut 
flowers, gardening services, floral arrangements, dry spices, 
and eggs (Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 4, 2013). 
Decree-Law 318 (2013) further expanded the direct 
commercialization of agricultural products by authorizing 
direct sales to the population at the following outlets: State 
Agricultural Markets (MAEs), Demand and Supply Markets 
(MOD), Leased Markets (agricultural outlets leased by the 
state to non-state producers), and stalls, or kiosks located 
in neighbourhoods, and highway rest stops. Retail prices of 
6 CPAs and UBPCs can deduct up to 12,000 CUP per associate or member from 
gross income for tax purposes (Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 53, 2012).
7 Agricultural producers operating under this modality are required to pay taxes and 
make social security contributions as stipulated by Law 113 (2012).
8 In addition to Fintour, S.A., Resolution 121 (2011) authorized the Banco de Credito 
y Comercio (BANDEC) and the Banco Metropolitano (BM) to provide custody, and 
transfer payment services in Cuban pesos (CUC) or convertible pesos (CUP) on behalf 
of tourism entities with direct purchases from authorized agricultural producers.
9 The Cuban economy operates under a system of monetary dualism with multiple 
exchange rates. For example, the official exchange rate between the “regular” Cuban 
peso (CUP) and the “convertible” Cuban peso (CUC) is 25 to 1, and the official ex-
change rate between the CUC and the USD is 0.80 per 1.00 USD. (See Mesa-Lago and 
Pérez-López (2015), Posada (2011), and Spadoni (2014) for more information about 
Cuba’s dual currency and multiple exchange rate systems.). 
these agricultural products are set by the Ministry of Finance 
and Prices; however, producers that operate in the MAEs 
that have been converted to non-agricultural cooperatives 
(CNAs) can set their own prices, but these must be approved 
by the Ministry of Finance and Prices (Gaceta Oficial de 
Cuba 35, 2013).
Micro-credits for Non-State Agricultural Producers
The approval of Decree-Law 289 2011 authorised the 
extension of micro-credits (or micro-loans) by state-run 
banks to private farmers and usufructuaries in Cuban pesos 
(CUP) (Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 40, 2011). The terms of these 
micro-credits are set by the lending institution based on the 
borrower’s risk profile, and type and value of collateral; 
the Central Bank of Cuba, rather than the lending institu-
tion, determines the interest rates for these micro-credits; 
and farmers can use them to purchase equipment and sup-
plies, cover the costs associated with field preparation and 
conditioning, and any other activities to improve agricultural 
production (Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 40, 2011).
Expansion of Usufruct Farming
The most profound agricultural reform implemented in 
Cuba since 2007 has been the expansion of usufruct farm-
ing (Febles et.al., 2017; Mesa-Lago, 2013, 2014; Nova 
González, 2013, 2013a, 2014; Nova González and González-
Corzo, 2015; Villalonga Soca, 2015). This process began 
with the approval of Decree-Laws 259 and 282 in 2008, 
which authorized the transfer of idle state-owned land to 
natural persons for up to ten (10) years and to legal persons 
for periods of up to twenty-five (25) years (Gaceta Oficial de 
Cuba 4, 2008). The maximum amount of land that could be 
transferred to usufruct farmers was limited to 13.42 hectares 
(ha); permanent investments in housing for usufructuaries 
and their families were excluded; the transfer of usufruct 
rights to third parties was prohibited; and the cancellation 
of usufruct contracts was only allowed under exceptional 
circumstances (Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 4, 2008). 
Decree-Laws 259 and 282 (2008) were repealed with the 
approval of Decree-Laws 300 and 304 in 2012. The limit 
of 13.42 ha for first-time usufructuaries was kept, but the 
maximum amount of land that could be transferred to natural 
persons who already possessed land (either in direct owner-
ship or in usufruct) was increased from 40.26 ha to 67.10 ha 
(Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 45, 2012). Usufruct farmers who 
already possessed land were required to be directly associ-
ated with a CPA or UBPC, and their plots had to be located 
in the immediate proximity of such cooperative or within 
five (5) kilometres (km) from its territory (Gaceta Oficial de 
Cuba 45, 2012). Usufruct farmers were allowed to construct 
permanent structures –including housing, but their size was 
limited to 1% of their plots, and they could receive compen-
sation from the state for the assessed value of such structures 
upon the termination of the usufruct contract (Gaceta Oficial 
de Cuba 45, 2012). 
Decree-Law 311 and Decree-Law 319 (2014) authorise 
farmers associated with the Credit and Services Coopera-
tives (CCS) to obtain up to 67.10 hectares (ha) of idle state-
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owned land in usufruct (Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 4, 2014). 
Usufruct farmers can acquire land beyond 5 km from CPAS, 
UBPCs, and state farms (Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 4, 2014).
The laws that regulate usufruct farming in Cuba were 
further modified with the approval of Decree-Laws 350 
and 358 in August 2018 (Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 39, 2018). 
These regulations, which replaced Decree-Laws 300 and 
304 (2012), extended usufruct contracts from 10 years to 20 
years for natural persons and from 25 years to an indefinite 
time period for legal persons; the size of the plots that can 
be transferred to first-time usufructuaries was doubled from 
13.42 ha. to 26.84 ha.; usufruct farmers can be associated 
with (state-owned) forestry and sugar agricultural enter-
prises; and usufruct rights can be granted for raising cattle 
(but farmers are required to grow their own fodder) (Gaceta 
Oficial de Cuba 39, 2018).
However, to obtain the land, usufructuaries are required 
to work on the land and administer it directly and personally 
(Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 39, 2018). The usufruct contract can 
be terminated (by the state) due to the use of illicit finan-
cial sources (by the usufructuary) for any purpose or reason 
(Gaceta Oficial de Cuba 39, 2018).
Impact of the Agricultural Reforms 
Land distribution
As Table1 illustrates, there has been a significant redis-
tribution of Cuba’s agricultural surface and cultivated area 
from the state sector to the non-state sector since 2007. 10 In 
2007, 35.8% of Cuba’s agricultural surface (2,371,200 ha) 
was held by the state sector, compared to 30.7% (1,912,000 
ha) in 2016. Similarly, the state’s share of the cultivated 
area declined from 23.2% (694,200 ha) in 2007 to 19.1% 
(521,900 ha) in 2016. Conversely, the non-state sector’s share 
of the agricultural surface increased from 64.2% in 2007 
(4,248,300 ha) in 2007 to 69.3% (4,314,700 ha) in 2016. The 
non-state sector’s share of the cultivated area increased from 
76.8% (2,294,300 ha) in 2007 to 80.9% (2,211,600 ha) in 
2016 (Table 1). 
There has been a notable reallocation of agricultural land 
within the non-state sector from the least autonomous and 
inefficient agricultural cooperatives (i.e., the UBPCs) to the 
more autonomous and productive CCSs and private farmers 
since 2007. As Table 1 shows, the UBPCs’ share of the agri-
cultural surface decreased from 37% (2,448,200 ha) in 2007 
to 24.5% (1 528 400 ha) in 2016. Similarly, their share of the 
country’s cultivated area declined from 39.8% (1,189,900 
ha) in 2007 to 30.7% (840,400 ha) in 2016. The CCSs and 
private farmers held 18.3% of Cuba’s agricultural surface 
(1,214,300 ha) and 26.7% of its cultivated area (799,100 ha) 
in 2007 (ONEI, 2010, 2017). By the end of 2016, the CCSs 
and private farmers held 36.7% of the agricultural surface 
(2,283,000 ha) and 40.4% of the cultivated area (1,103,900 
ha) (Table 1).
Another tangible effect of the agricultural reforms 
implemented in Cuba since 2007 has been the reduction of 
10 The non-state sector includes Basic Units of Cooperative Production (UBPC), 
Agricultural Production Cooperatives (CPAs), Credit and Services Cooperatives 
(CCSs), private farmers (agricultures pequeños) and usufructuaries (ONEI, 2017).
idle land.11 As Table 2 shows, the amount of idle land was 
reduced from 1,282,800 ha in 2007 to 917,300 ha in 2017, 
representing a decrease of 25.6% during this period (ONEI, 
2008, 2018). The most notable reductions have taken place 
in the non-state sector, which experienced a decline in idle 
land of 44.7%, from 605,600 ha in 2007 to 335,100 ha in 
2017. Within the non-state sector, the CCSs have experi-
enced the most significant (-91.5%) decline in idle land dur-
ing the 2007-2017 period, followed by the CPAs (-90.0%), 
UBPCs (-64.2%), and usufruct farmers (-20%) (Table 2).
The agricultural reforms introduced in Cuba since 2007 
have also contributed to the redistribution of idle land from 
the state to the non-state sector (Table 2). In 2007, the state 
sector held 50.9% (627,200 ha) of Cuba’s idle land; this fig-
ure increased to 63.5% (582,200 ha) in 2017 (Table 2). By 
contrast, the non-state sector’s share of the country’s idle land 
fell from 49.1% (605,600 ha) to 36.5% (582,200 ha) during 
the 2007-2017 period (Table 2). As Table 2 indicates, the 
share of idle land held by non-state agricultural producers, 
except private farmers, and usufructuaries, declined between 
2007 and 2017. This is mainly attributed to the expansion of 
usufruct farming after 2008 and 2012, and the reduction in 
the amount of agricultural land (including idle land) held by 
the state sector (Nova González, 2018).
Non-sugar agricultural production
Increasing agricultural output to substitute imports, and 
improving food security remains one of the principal objec-
tives of the agricultural reforms implemented in Cuba since 
2007 (García-Álvarez and Nova González, 2014; Riera 
and Swinnen, 2016). As Table 3 demonstrates, production 
increased in six (6) out of the nine (9) principal non-sugar 
crop categories reported by Cuba’s National Statistics Office 
(ONEI) during the 2008-2016 period. Output increased in 
the following crop categories: (1) cocoa (87.1%), (2) leg-
umes (40.5%), (3) plantains (34%), viandas (33%), (5) other 
fruits (27.9%), and (6) cereals (i.e. rice and corn) (20.6%). 
Conversely, the following crops experienced lower output 
levels between 2008 and 2016: (1) citrus fruits (-69.5%), (2) 
tobacco (-8.4%), and (3) vegetables (-2.2%) (Table 3).
These trends seem to suggest that at least in terms of 
production Cuba’s recent agricultural reforms have achieved 
mixed results. However, at the present time, domestic agri-
cultural production is unable to satisfy the country’s food 
demand, and Cuba imports a significant share of the food 
and agricultural products consumed by its population. In 
2007, Cuba imported approximately $1.5 billion in food and 
agricultural products, representing 15.4% of total merchan-
dise imports (ONEI, 2010). Food and agricultural imports 
increased to an estimated $1.8 billion in 2016, representing 
17.3% of total merchandise imports (ONEI, 2017). Cuba 
imports 64% of the rice, 52% of the beans, 68% of the 
corn, 100% of the wheat flour, and 100% of the vegetable 
oils consumed by its population, highlighting its relatively-
high levels of external sector dependency, and its inability 
11 Between 2002 and 2007, the amount of idle land in Cuba increased by 32.7%, from 
929,200 ha to 1,232,800 ha; according to Riera and Swinnen (2016), the need to reduce 
the amount of idle state-owned land to increase production, substitute imports, and 
improve food security was one of the principal objectives of the agricultural reforms 
implemented in Cuba since 2007. 
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Table 1: Land distribution based on tenure form in Cuba, 2007 and 2016.
2007  State Sector Non-State Sector
Thousand Hectares Total Total Total UBPC CPA CCS and  Private
Total Land Surface 10,988 6,088 4,900 2,804 692 1,402
Agricultural Surface 6,620 2,371 4,249 2,448 585 1,214
Cultivated Area 2,988 694 2,294 1,189 305 799
Non-Cultivated Area 3,631 1,677 1,954 1,258 280 415
Idle Land 1,232 627 605 465 73 66
2016    
Thousand Hectares Total Total Total UBPC CPA CCS and  Private
Total Land Surface 10,988 6,081 4,907 1,782 509 2,616
Agricultural Surface 6,226 1,912 4,314 1,528 503 2,283
Cultivated Area 2,733 521 2,212 840 267 1,104
Non-Cultivated Area 4,761 4,168 593 254 6 333
Idle Land 883 520 363 192 9 162
Source: ONEI 2010, and 2017.
to substitute essential food and agricultural imports (Nova 
González, 2018). 
The mixed results of the agricultural reforms imple-
mented in Cuba since 2007, and the agricultural sector’s 
inability to satisfy domestic demand, generate substantial 
export earnings, and reduce the country’s dependency on 
imports can be attributed to several factors. According to 
Nova González (2013), there are three (3) fundamental unre-
solved issues that limit the impact of the agricultural reforms 
introduced since 2007: (a) producers must be allowed to 
freely choose the optimal inputs (e.g., labour and capital) to 
produce the desired output levels, (b) the state needs to rec-
ognise and accept the role of the market as complementary 
coordinating and rationing mechanism, and (c) the state pro-
curement monopoly must be eliminated and replaced with 
more diversified forms of agricultural commercialization 
and distribution. 
Table 2: Idle Land by Tenure Type in Cuba, 2002-2017, Thousand Hectares.
 2002 2007 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Total 929.2 1,232.8 1,046.1 962.1 924.8 883.9 917.3
State Sector 516.1 627.2 574.9 546.6 537.6 520.4 582.2
Non-State Sector 413.1 605.6 471.2 415.5 387.2 363.5 335.1
UBPC 301.3 465.4 258.5 230.7 216.8 192.0 166.6
CPA 53.6 73.4 5.2 6.9 8.9 8.8 6.7
CCS 53.6 45.7 4.0 3.9 5.1 4.5 3.9
Private Farmers 58.0 20.6 96.7 76.7 68.4 70.9 72.5
Usufruct Farmers n.a. n.a. 106.8 97.3 87.9 87.3 85.4
Sources: ONEI, 2008, 2014a, 2015a, 2016a, 2017a, and 2018.
Table 3: Non-sugar agricultural production in Cuba, selected crops, thousand tons.
CROPS 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Viandas(a) 2,151 2,236 2,250 2,280 2,337 2,239 2,507 2,634 2,860
Plantains 758 670 735 835 885 659 836 890 1,016
Vegetables 2,439 2,549 2,141 2,200 2,112 2,407 2,499 2,424 2,385
Cereals 762 868 779 920 1,002 1,099 1,013 781 919
Legumes 97 111 80 133 127 130 136 118 137
Tobacco 22 25 21 20 20 24 20 25 20
Citrus Fruits 392 418 345 265 204 167 97 115 119
Other Fruits 739 748 762 817 965 925 884 943 945
Cocoa 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
Sources: ONEI, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013,2014,2015,2016 and 2017.
Non-sugar production has also been hindered by reduc-
tions in the cultivated area since 2007. The cultivated area 
decreased by 8.5% from 2,988,500 ha in 2007 to 2,733,500 
ha in 2016, and fell in four (4) of the nine (9) major crop 
categories reported in Table 3 (ONEI, 2017). Between 2008 
and 2016, the area planted and under production dedicated 
to vegetables decreased by 28.3%, from 259,073 ha to 
185,743 ha (ONEI, 2013, 2017). Similarly, the area planted 
and under production dedicated to tobacco (Cuba’s prin-
cipal agricultural commodity) fell by 46.7%, from 23,048 
ha in 2008 to 12,292 ha in 2016; the area planted with cit-
rus fruits (another important crop) decreased by 64.7%, 
from 45,635 ha in 2008 to 16,105 ha in 2016; and the area 
planted with various tropical fruits (e.g., guava, mango, and 
papaya) decreased by 1.8%, from 83,058 ha to 81,585 ha 
between 2008 and 2016 (ONEI, 2013, 2017).
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Cooperatives (CCS) and private farmers has increased sig-
nificantly.
Cuba’s agricultural reforms have also resulted in signifi-
cant reductions in the amount of idle land since 2007. This 
process has been mainly driven by the expansion of usufruct 
farming after 2012. The largest reductions in idle land have 
taken place in the non-state sector, particularly the CCS.
Non-sugar agricultural production has experienced 
mixed results since 2007. Even though output increased in 
six (6) of the nine (9) non-sugar production crop categories 
reported by Cuba’s National Statistics Office (ONEI) dur-
ing the 2008-2016 period, the agricultural sector has been 
unable to generate the quantities of output required to satisfy 
domestic demand, and Cuba currently imports a significant 
share of the food and agricultural products consumed by its 
population. These trends suggest that (at least so far) the agri-
cultural reforms implemented since 2007 have not been able 
to sufficiently incentivise production to reduce Cuba’s (rel-
atively-high) dependency on food and agricultural imports.
This situation can be attributed to several factors. The area 
dedicated to agriculture and under production has decreased 
significantly since 2007; at the same time, agricultural yields 
for important crops have declined, mainly due to the lack 
of fertilisers, irrigation equipment, and machinery, and to 
adverse weather conditions. Cuba’s agricultural producers 
lack the autonomy necessary to make optimal input and out-
put decisions. The role of the market as an important eco-
nomic coordination mechanism and its price-signalling and 
rationing functions remain strictly constrained by excessive 
state intervention. Despite limited “liberalisation” measures, 
the state retains its monopolistic control over key aspects of 
the commercialisation and distribution of most agricultural 
products.
Cuban agriculture has also been affected by the displace-
ment of labour to other sectors of the economy, overseas 
migration, and the aging of the Cuban population (par-
ticularly the agricultural labour force). On the institutional 
front, agricultural producers face strict limitations on private 
property rights and on the concentration of wealth, exces-
sive taxes, a complex bureaucracy, and hostile state policies 
(particularly towards private farmers and usufructuaries). 
Finally, Cuba’s agricultural producers regularly contend with 
a wide range of logistical and administrative constraints and 
challenges (e.g. deteriorated infrastructure, poor telecommu-
nications, a disconnected supply chain, insufficient access 
to essential inputs and sources of financing, etc.) that affect 
production and limit the agricultural sector’s contributions 
to the economy.
While the agricultural reforms implemented since 2007 
represent a step in the right direction, more profound struc-
tural reforms are necessary to achieve sustainable, long-term, 
progress in this vital sector of the Cuban economy
Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural output has also been 
affected by the exodus of qualified workers, field workers, 
and technicians (Nova González, 2018). Agriculture’s share 
of total employment fell from 18.8% in 2007 to 17.8% in 
2016, and employment in this key sector of the Cuban econ-
omy decreased by 10.7%, from 919,100 workers in 2007 to 
820,900 workers in 2016 (ONEI, 2010, 2017). Other demo-
graphic pressures, such as the aging of the Cuban population, 
the displacement of workers to other sectors of the economy, 
and overseas migration, have contributed to declines in agri-
cultural sector employment.
The limited scope and nature of the agricultural reforms 
introduced since 2007, excessive regulations, and strenuous 
bureaucratic processes have hindered agricultural production 
in Cuba (Mesa-Lago, 2014). State-imposed restrictions on 
private property rights, prohibitions against the concentra-
tion of wealth, foreign investment, and exports, as well as an 
onerous tax system, and a restrictive business environment12 
(particularly towards private farmers and usufructuaries) 
have been (and remain) important limiting factors (Mesa-
Lago, et. al., 2018; Spadoni, 2014).
Finally, since 2007, other factors that have constrained 
and continue to affect Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural out-
put include the poor conditions of warehouses and storage 
facilities, an antiquated communications system, dilapidated 
roads, rail networks, and transportation system, an inefficient 
and disconnected supply chain, insufficient access to essen-
tial inputs (e.g. fertilizers, irrigation equipment, machinery, 
seeds, and other technologies) (Feinberg, 2018; Mesa-Lago, 
et. al., 2018; Spadoni, 2014).
Conclusions
Despite its economic importance, Cuba’s agricultural 
sector faces a wide range of challenges and limitations that 
constrain its productive capabilities and economic contribu-
tions. Agricultural producers face excessive state interven-
tion, onerous taxes, restrictive state policies, inadequate 
access to capital, insufficient access to essential inputs 
(including labour), a deteriorated infrastructure, and ineffi-
cient and inadequate transportation and telecommunications 
systems. The state limits their access to foreign investment, 
and agricultural producers are unable to freely participate in 
global supply chains.
To address some of these challenges, incentivise pro-
duction, and substitute imports, the Cuban government has 
implemented a series of agricultural reforms since 2007. 
These reforms have contributed to the redistribution of 
Cuba’s agricultural land from the state to the non-state sec-
tor, and to the redistribution of agricultural land within the 
non-state sector. Since 2007, the share of the agricultural sur-
face and cultivated area held by the less Basic Units of Agri-
cultural Production (UBPC) has declined, while the amount 
held by the more productive and efficient Credit and Services 
12 The preferential tax treatment given by Law 113 (20123) to agricultural coopera-
tives and state enterprises is an example of the hostile business environment confronted 
by individual agricultural producers in Cuba; in addition, cooperatives and state enter-
prises receive subsidized essential inputs (e.g., fertilizer, equipment, machinery) from 
the state, operate under a friendlier regulatory framework, and may be authorized to 
receive foreign investment. 
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